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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2179
________________
JESSIE M. SNYDER,
           Appellant
 v.
MARK W. EVERSON,
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01561)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 20, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE AND AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: June 27, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Jessie M. Snyder appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing her complaint.  We will affirm.
1  The consent judgment was filed in United States v. Snyder, No. 86-cv-00466
(W.D. Pa. July 19, 1991).
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In November 2005, Snyder instituted suit against the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”).  In her complaint, Snyder alleged that in October 2005, she
received a levy and notices of seizure from the IRS, the amount of the levy being
$1,251,631.84, for unpaid taxes for the period ended December 31, 1978.  She stated that
the IRS collection actions stemmed from a July 1991 consent judgment entered against
her and her husband (now deceased), in the amount of $408,411.71.  Snyder contended
that the matter was fully settled, by agreement with the government, through payment of
$10,000 to the IRS.  Snyder attached to her complaint copies of several documents,
including the levy and notices of seizure, the consent judgment,1 the first page of the
settlement agreement, the $10,000 check, and a notice that part of her Social Security
payments had been taken to offset her debt to the IRS.  Alleging that the IRS’s collection
actions were occurring by error, mistake, or fraud, Snyder sought temporary and
permanent injunctive relief to prevent the IRS from further collection activity and to
refund the amounts taken from her Social Security benefits.  She also sought punitive
damages if the IRS was determined to have committed fraudulent acts.
The government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction.  It attached a complete copy of the settlement agreement, noting
that the agreement required annual installment payments to be made from 1991 through
2 The installment payment terms are also shown on the (incomplete) first page of
the settlement agreement attached to Snyder’s complaint.
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1998, in addition to the initial $10,000 payment.2  The agreement also specified that if the
Snyders’ income was insufficient to trigger a payment, they were to submit a sworn
statement of income with a copy of their tax return.  Because no payments or sworn
statements were made after the initial payment, the government determined that Snyder
was in default of the agreement and thus became liable for the taxes owed.  As such, the
government argued that Snyder’s lawsuit naming the IRS Commissioner was actually
against the United States, the real party in interest for disputing tax liability. 
Accordingly, to the extent that Snyder sought damages relief, the government argued that
the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the United States has
sovereign immunity.  In addition, the government argued that the tax exception to the
Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) and the Anti-Injunction Act (26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a)) barred Snyder’s suit to the extent she requested injunctive relief.  Moreover,
the government argued that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
government defendant because Snyder had failed to serve the complaint in accordance
with Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In response, Snyder did not dispute any of the government’s assertions.  Rather,
she argued only that the government’s argument that she breached the settlement
agreement was time-barred under Pennsylvania law.  In reply, the government stated that
the consent agreement contains a waiver of the statute of limitations, that state-law
statutes of limitations do not apply to the federal government’s tax collection, and the
applicable federal limitations period did not apply to the consent judgment entered in this
case.
On March 7, 2006, citing the subject matter and personal jurisdictional bases
raised by the government, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the
suit, granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed Snyder’s complaint. 
Snyder appeals.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In her brief on appeal, Snyder
appears to concede that the tax debt at issue remains unpaid and that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction over her complaint.  She no longer pursues her statute of limitations
argument.  She does not contend that the District Court committed any error in dismissing
her complaint, and we discern no error upon our review of the record.  Rather, Snyder’s
sole argument is that in April 2006, after the dismissal of her complaint, she promised to
pay the government $1,300,000 to satisfy her tax debt.  To the extent that she asks this
Court to grant substantive relief based on this matter outside of the District Court record
on appeal, we decline to do so.  In any event, Snyder’s new argument provides no basis to
disturb the District Court’s judgment.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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